33 Session 24: Jensen Bias · Pigouvian Tax · Welfare (Synthesis)
| Unit | 4 — Math Intuition Bridges (final synthesis) |
| Book Chapters | 18, 19 (concepts only — full derivations in Session 29 Track 2) |
| Track | Common core (both tracks) |
| Assessment milestone | PS3 due (start of class) |
33.1 Learning Objectives
By the end of this session, students will be able to:
- State the closed-form Jensen bias formula \(B(T) = (\pi_2/2) \cdot \Pi_{liq}(T)\) and compute it for any asset class.
- Articulate the welfare gap (\(\Delta W \approx 2.3\%\)/yr) as the cost of the McKean-Vlasov externality.
- Explain the Pigouvian exit tax intuitively: tax on secondary exits during stress, designed to align private and social incentives.
- Compute the optimal tax rate \(\tau^*(L)\) at different liquidity states using the calibrated formula.
- Articulate “GE-LAV in one slide” — the complete framework synthesis.
33.2 Pre-Class Assignment
- Submit: PS3 (due at start of class)
- Read: Book Chapters 18, 19 (concepts only)
33.3 In-Class Outline (75 minutes)
| Time | Segment | Format |
|---|---|---|
| 0:00–0:05 | PS3 collection · Today: synthesis | Lecture |
| 0:05–0:25 | The Jensen convexity bias (full formula) | Lecture |
| 0:25–0:45 | The welfare gap and externality cost | Lecture |
| 0:45–1:05 | The Pigouvian exit tax | Lecture + chart |
| 1:05–1:15 | “GE-LAV in one slide” + Q&A | Synthesis |
33.4 Discussion Questions
- The Jensen bias formula \(B(T) = (\pi_2/2) \cdot \Pi_{liq}(T)\) depends on five calibrated parameters. If any of those parameters are wrong, the bias estimate is wrong. Which parameter is most fragile? How would you stress-test it?
- The Pigouvian tax raises ~$14B at GFC depth. Distributing this back to remaining LPs is the textbook answer. Politically, would governments distribute, or absorb? How does that change the framework’s appeal?
- The valuation hierarchy DCF ⊊ LAV ⊊ GE-LAV implies GE-LAV is the “right” framework. Why isn’t DCF abandoned today, given the framework exists?
33.5 Worked Example: Computing Everything for One Asset
Setup: \(\$100M\) infrastructure asset, 15-year horizon, \(L_0 = -0.5\) (mild stress).
Step 1: Jensen bias
\(\Pi_{liq}(15) = 0.1024 \cdot [15 - (1 - e^{-13.5})/0.9] = 0.1024 \cdot [15 - 1.111] = 0.1024 \cdot 13.889 = 1.422\)
Wait — let me recompute: \(\Pi_{liq}(T) = \sigma^2 \cdot [T - (1 - e^{-2\kappa T})/(2\kappa)]\)
\(\Pi_{liq}(15) = 0.1024 \cdot [15 - (1 - e^{-13.5})/0.9] \approx 0.1024 \cdot [15 - 1.111] \approx 1.422\)
\(B(15) = (\pi_2/2) \cdot \Pi_{liq}(15) = (0.021/2) \cdot 1.422 = 0.0149\) ≈ 1.5%
Step 2: LAV value
DCF value (at constant 7.5%): \(V^{DCF} \approx \$100M\) (assuming normalization)
LAV value (Jensen-adjusted): \(V^{LAV} = V^{DCF} \cdot (1 + B(15)) = \$101.5M\)
Step 3: GE-LAV value at current stress
At \(L_0 = -0.5\), equilibrium premium ≈ 5.5% (vs. DCF assumption 3.5%) → effective rate ~9.5%
\(V^{GE-LAV} \approx V^{DCF} \cdot e^{-(0.095 - 0.075) \cdot 15} \approx \$100M \cdot 0.74 = \$74M\)
(Account for ongoing cash flow generation roughly cancels the discount rate effect over the term)
Step 4: Welfare loss attributable to this position
Per-year welfare loss for this asset: ~\(\$2.3M\) (2.3% of \(\$100M)\)
Cumulative over 15 years: ~\(\$25M\) (with discount)
Step 5: Optimal Pigouvian tax if held in stress
If LP exits at \(L = -0.5\): optimal \(\tau^* = 1.5\%\). On \(\$100M\) sale: \(\$1.5M\) tax.
If LP exits at GFC depth: optimal \(\tau^* = 7.0\%\). On (deeply discounted) sale: substantial.
33.6 What to Expect Next Session
Sessions 25 onward are split track:
- Track 1 students report to the applied case workshop. Sessions 25 covers PE buyout valuation.
- Track 2 students report to the mathematical session. Session 25 covers the full HJB derivation.
Both tracks: Session 25 is your first split-track session. Make sure you know which track you’re in and where it meets.
Reading for Track 1: Bain Capital case study or similar (will be distributed).
Reading for Track 2: Book Chapter 11 (HJB, with full derivations).
PS4 drops at end of Session 25. Track-specific.